Full Q&A — Where the Hawaiian Kingdom Stands Today (Status & Condition)

It asserts the Hawaiian Kingdom remains a sovereign State in continuity under international law, while effective control of its government has been disrupted by a prolonged and unlawful occupation since 1893.

It states no treaty of annexation exists between the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States and that sovereignty was not transferred by consent or conquest.

It says occupation does not transfer sovereignty; it imposes duties on the occupying power and preserves the rights, nationality, and legal identity of the occupied State and its people.

It states Hawaiian Subjects are regarded as Protected Persons under international humanitarian law in the context of occupation.

It describes the doctrine of necessity as preserving continuity of governance through reconstituted lawful institutions to safeguard the people and preserve the State’s legal personality until restoration is possible.

It is described as the provisional executive authority of the Hawaiian Kingdom, maintaining constitutional order under the 1864 Constitution.

It describes OHS as a chartered government reporting and humanitarian protection agency—an administrative and protective organ of a State under occupation, grounded in law and documentation.

• Verifying and registering Hawaiian Subjects
• Issuing lawful identification and certification
• Responding to unlawful detentions and jurisdictional violations
• Documenting human rights and humanitarian law breaches
• Reporting violations to international bodies (including ICC and UN mechanisms)

It says the RCI has documented war crimes and human rights violations arising from the prolonged occupation and affirms the Kingdom’s continuing Statehood, the occupation’s unlawfulness, and exposure to universal jurisdiction.

De jure: the Kingdom is alive and sovereign in law. De facto: administrative control is exercised by the occupying power, often in violation of international humanitarian law.

It emphasizes lawful resistance, disciplined documentation, protection of people, and international engagement—building evidence for accountability and restoration.

It describes it as a domestic, derivative administrative entity created under U.S. municipal law—not a sovereign government grounded in international law or Hawaiian Kingdom law.

It argues the process did not include a treaty of annexation, a peace treaty ending war/occupation, or a lawful international transfer of sovereignty—so municipal acts cannot extinguish a foreign State’s sovereignty.

• It cannot enter treaties as a State
• It is not a UN member
• It is not recognized as a sovereign State by foreign governments
• It cannot represent Hawaiʻi internationally

It states an occupying power may not replace the sovereign government with its own civil institutions, and must respect existing laws and institutions unless absolutely prevented.

It describes them as occupation instruments—administrative proxies—rather than sovereign successors.

It lists treaty of cession, valid annexation under international law, or voluntary dissolution of the prior State—and says none exist for Hawaiʻi.

It states the State of Hawaiʻi operates de facto (in fact), but effectiveness does not equal legality; control alone does not cure an unlawful origin.

It says Hawaiian Subjects’ nationality flows from the Hawaiian Kingdom and is preserved under international law; State jurisdiction over them is framed as lacking lawful international basis.

It attributes persistence to lack of international conclusion of the challenge, administrative normalization benefiting the occupier, and the principle that absence of enforcement does not negate law.

It concludes the State of Hawaiʻi functions as a U.S. municipal government without lawful title to sovereignty; it is not a successor State and cannot extinguish Hawaiian nationality.

It states a territory is occupied when a foreign power places it under effective control without acquiring sovereignty; occupation is a legal status under international humanitarian law.

• Occupation does not transfer sovereignty
• The occupied State continues to exist in law
• The occupier is a temporary administrator
• Occupation lasts until peace treaty or lawful restoration

• Civilians are Protected Persons
• Nationality cannot be changed
• Occupation law applies even if the occupier denies occupation

It defines martial law as a domestic emergency measure declared by a government within its own sovereign territory, used temporarily when civil authorities cannot function.

It lists natural disasters, insurrections, and wartime emergencies inside a State’s own territory as examples.

• Martial law is domestic; occupation is international
• Martial law is declared by sovereign government; occupation exists by fact regardless of declaration
• Martial law is temporary emergency; occupation continues until lawful termination
• Occupation involves a foreign power; martial law does not
• Occupation creates Protected Person status; martial law does not

It argues martial law requires sovereignty and a valid declaration; it states there is no valid declaration or constitutional basis and civil courts/legislatures/agencies continue operating (incompatible with martial law).

• Foreign control exercised by the United States
• No treaty of annexation or cession
• No peace treaty ending hostilities
• Continuous administration imposed since 1893
• Sovereignty never extinguished (as asserted)

It says lawful occupation arises through lawful hostilities and compliance with occupation law; it characterizes Hawaiʻi’s occupation as illegal because it began with an unlawful overthrow, lacked lawful war declaration and treaty transfer, and has had systematic violations over time.

It says illegality does not erase obligations; occupation law still applies, Protected Person status still exists, and violations can become international crimes with increased responsibility.

It concludes Hawaiʻi is not under martial law, is under occupation (illegal and prolonged), the Kingdom’s sovereignty remains intact (as asserted), Hawaiian Subjects are Protected Persons, and IHL governs.

It defines a Protected Person (Geneva Convention IV, Article 4) as a civilian who, in war or occupation, is in the hands of a power of which they are not a national.

No. The document says Protected Person status exists automatically by law and does not require registration, permission, or recognition by the occupying power.

It argues the Kingdom was recognized, never lawfully annexed or ceded, and is under foreign control; therefore Hawaiian Subjects retain Kingdom nationality and fall within Article 4 protections.

• Protection from unlawful detention and deportation
• Protection from forced allegiance or naturalization
• Protection from coercion, intimidation, collective punishment
• Right to retain national identity and legal status
• Protection from being tried under unlawfully imposed laws (as asserted)
• Right to humanitarian relief and legal recourse

It states that within continuity governance under occupation, OHS operates as the highest active administrative authority safeguarding Hawaiian Subjects, deriving authority from Kingdom law and international humanitarian law (not U.S. law).

It describes a COPP as a Kingdom-issued humanitarian protection instrument—evidence and formal notice of Protected Person status that already exists under international law.

• Not a passport of the occupier
• Not a request for recognition
• Not a commercial/corporate document
• Not something that creates status

• Notice of status to U.S./State officials
• Triggers obligations under Geneva IV, Hague, and customary IHL
• Creates evidence for accountability after notice
• Rebuts presumed domestic jurisdiction over the bearer

It says recognition limits jurisdiction, exposes liability, triggers scrutiny, and acknowledges occupation; but denial does not negate obligations because facts create duties in international law.

It states: you do not become a Protected Person because of a document—you receive the document because you already are one (by law).

• Full name
• Date of birth
• Kingdom nationality (Hawaiian Subject)
• Registry/verification number

It says this establishes the bearer as a national of the occupied State, not the occupying power.

It says the COPP explicitly declares Protected Person status under Geneva IV Article 4, affirms the territorial context, and identifies U.S./State authority as foreign in that context—intended to remove presumption of domestic jurisdiction and place the matter under IHL.

It lists citations to the Hague Convention (IV) 1907, Geneva Convention IV 1949, Hawaiian Kingdom law in continuity, and issuance under the doctrine of necessity.

It says it constitutes formal notice; actions after notice are legally attributable and may constitute grave breaches or war crimes, and “ignorance” is no longer a defense once served/acknowledged.

It lists signature of an authorized OHS officer/director, official seal, date of issuance, and reference number—presented as an official Kingdom record for international review.

• Not subject to presumed U.S./State jurisdiction (as asserted)
• Entitled to Protected Person treatment
• Shielded from coercion/forced allegiance/unlawful detention
• Under IHL protections

It describes a prison or jail warden as an agent of the occupying power when holding a Protected Person; once COPP notice exists, obligations “change immediately.”

To recognize Protected Person status and cease treating the individual as a domestic criminal subject; failure after notice is framed as willful disregard.

It claims the warden is obligated to prove lawful authority (e.g., treaty of annexation/cession, valid international instrument, or lawful authority under occupation law); absent proof, continued detention is framed as unlawful.

• No coercion, intimidation, forced compliance
• No compelled pleas, waivers, admissions
• Humane treatment consistent with Geneva IV

It says wardens must notify supervising authorities, preserve records/communications, and avoid actions that could constitute grave breaches.

It claims that after notice, actions are no longer “routine,” liability becomes individual, and “following orders” is not a defense under international law.

It says each day becomes a continuing violation, each act compounds liability, evidence accumulates for international reporting and possible prosecution, and silence/non-response may be treated as tacit acquiescence to lack of authority.

It says a COPP does not require U.S. recognition, State of Hawaiʻi approval, or court validation; international law binds occupiers whether they agree or not (as asserted).

It says Protected Person status (Article 4) and COPP notice establish knowledge; once notice exists, obligations attach immediately.

It frames OHS as the competent national authority in continuity for Protected Persons and says occupation law requires interface with the protected person’s national authority (not substitution by the detainer).

It says reporting is required to verify status/registry, establish lawful jurisdiction (if any), prevent unlawful treatment, and preserve an evidentiary record; failure blocks protection mechanisms.

It links non-reporting after notice to willful deprivation of rights/protection and unlawful confinement, stating knowledge + omission = willfulness in IHL (as presented).

It says Protected Persons must not be placed into general population; mixing exposes them to coercion/violence/forced compliance and constitutes inhuman treatment and unlawful confinement under IHL (as asserted).

It says the individual is no longer an “inmate” or ward of the State; presumed domestic jurisdiction is rebutted; any custody must comply with occupation law rather than penal law.

It says nationality/foreign character is established; from that moment acts and omissions are attributable, recorded, and “following orders” is not a defense.

It lists the warden, supervisors, transport/classification officers, and medical/custodial staff in the chain of command, and says repeated violations elevate personal and command responsibility exposure.

It argues grave breaches are prosecutable under universal jurisdiction, office does not immunize, and failure to report plus continued detention plus mixing in general population creates a documented pattern and continuing offense record.

It states that once a COPP is issued, custody becomes internationally governed; ignoring that transforms routine administration into criminal exposure under international law.

It says detention of Protected Persons is exceptional and strictly regulated; unlawful confinement becomes a grave breach especially when jurisdiction is lacking or detention continues after notice (knowledge + continuation = willfulness as described).

Immediate separation from general population, suspension of domestic penal processing/classification, and preservation of identity/dignity/safety under IHL standards.

No. It says separation is non-discretionary; failure to separate is presented as per se evidence of unlawful confinement after notice.

It frames OHS as the competent national authority for Protected Persons; after notice, the detainer must report custody status, permit oversight, and prevent further violations; non-reporting is described as willful obstruction.

It claims OHS is authorized to enter any jail/prison at any time to verify conditions, assess health, and ensure compliance; denial or delay after notice is framed as obstruction increasing liability.

It says communications become legal matters; interference is framed as coercion/inhuman treatment/suppression of humanitarian access, with each interference treated as a separate violation.

It claims OHS agents may demand release where no lawful jurisdiction exists, retrieve Subjects to prevent grave breaches, and secure evidence—stating this flows from international law rather than occupier permission.

It states unlawful confinement is a continuing offense: each day renews the violation, each official is newly exposed, and the evidentiary record compounds, triggering international scrutiny after notice.

It claims civil liability can attach to the State and individual agents; it states immunity defenses do not shield grave breaches (as asserted within the document’s framework).

It says once a COPP is issued, detention stops being “corrections” and becomes international criminal exposure day-by-day until the violation ends.

It describes an OHS agent as a lawful officer of the Hawaiian Kingdom in continuity, a humanitarian protection/reporting officer, and an internationally relevant witness and notice-bearer under occupation law.

It says occupation law requires respect for existing institutions and prohibits coercion/retaliation against officials, and requires allowing humanitarian/protective offices to function.

The document says no—when acting officially, they perform humanitarian protection, detention oversight, and record-building; retaliation/obstruction after notice is framed as willful interference.

• Arresting/detaining an OHS agent for performing duties
• Denying access to facilities or Protected Persons
• Threatening/harassing/intimidating an agent
• Retaliating through employment/licensing/administrative sanctions
• Using force/restraints/coercive tactics without lawful basis

It says once an agent identifies themselves and function, knowledge is established.

It says mistreatment may constitute obstruction of humanitarian functions, coercion against officials, intimidation/persecution under color of authority, and violations of occupation law—especially serious when connected to Protected Person cases.

It emphasizes individual criminal responsibility; after notice, each officer is personally accountable, “following orders” is not a defense, and rank/position does not confer immunity (as presented).

It invokes command/superior responsibility to include supervisors, command staff, department heads, and policymakers who authorize, tolerate, or fail to prevent retaliation.

It lists formal incident reports, evidence preservation (video/logs/communications), notice to international bodies, preparation of referral dossiers for ICC-OTP, and use of universal jurisdiction mechanisms where applicable.

It says the phrase reflects jurisdictional hierarchy (authority from sovereign continuity and IHL), not force; interference is framed as engaging international—not local—legal consequences.

It says OHS may document and formally notice violations, demand cessation, escalate to international oversight bodies, protect agents/Subjects through lawful means, and prepare evidence for judicial review—without imposing punishment itself.

It says interference with an OHS agent moves the issue beyond local discretion into international law, evidence, and accountability mechanisms.

It claims presumed State jurisdiction is rebutted; custody is no longer routine; detention becomes internationally regulated; continued holding becomes unlawful confinement (as framed by the document).

It claims unlawful confinement is a continuing offense—each day renews liability, each official is newly exposed, and evidence accumulates, increasing potential civil damages and risk.

It claims good-faith defenses fail, qualified immunity weakens, and sovereign immunity is pierced where rights claims attach (as asserted by the document).

It claims it creates precedent, opens discovery into broader practices, exposes taxation/land/criminal systems to scrutiny, and risks class-action-scale liability—so risk management favors de-escalation.

False imprisonment / unlawful confinement, with per-day damages and potential emotional distress and punitive damages where allowed.

Civil rights violations for deprivation of liberty, due process, and equal protection under color of law (as framed), including damages, attorney fees, and injunctive relief.

It lists continuing prosecution or confinement despite knowledge of lack of jurisdiction, with damages such as lost income, reputational harm, and emotional distress.

It lists unjust enrichment for collection of taxes, fines, fees, and assessments “without lawful authority,” seeking restitution, interest, and accounting (as asserted).

It lists conversion/taking of property for seizure of land, vehicles, wages, or assets via liens/forfeitures/enforcement actions lacking jurisdiction (as framed), seeking return and damages for loss of use.

It lists claims for violations of international law “incorporated into domestic law,” seeking declaratory relief, damages, and injunctions (availability noted by the document as forum/statute dependent).

• Intentional infliction of emotional distress
• Negligence / gross negligence (failure to separate/report/protect)
• Retaliation claims
• Declaratory & injunctive relief (release, cessation, policy changes)
• Accounting & restitution actions
• Class actions based on common policies

It says de-escalation or release limits exposure; continuation multiplies damages, weakens defenses, and risks precedent-setting judgments.

It argues occupation law imposes duties on officials once Protected Person notice exists, and frames OHS as the competent national authority—making cooperation mandatory rather than discretionary.

• Status verification
• Conditions of custody
• Health and welfare checks
• Communications and access
• Lawful release or transfer

It says working around OHS increases liability; working with OHS reduces it.

It says cooperation, prompt separation, access/oversight, and following written directives create a record of good-faith compliance that helps protect against personal civil liability, command-responsibility exposure, and scrutiny.

It claims early cooperation stops continuing violations, closes evidentiary windows, prevents escalation, and protects institutions; obstruction accelerates escalation.

It says OHS involvement is preventive: prevent grave breaches, ensure lawful treatment, correct errors early, and reduce exposure—benefiting both agents and institutions.

It says once a Protected Person is identified, calls/mail and custody decisions become legal matters; silence or delay can be interpreted as acquiescence; open communication demonstrates transparency and preserves defenses.

It says cooperation prevents precedent-setting lawsuits, limits discovery exposure, avoids class-action risk, and protects budgets/personnel; non-compliance risks systemic challenges, injunctions, and reputational damage.

• Follow clear directives
• Allow access when notified
• Separate Protected Persons immediately
• Report status changes promptly

It says cooperating with OHS protects agents; non-compliance turns routine duties into legal exposure no agency wants.

It summarizes: the Kingdom continues as a sovereign State in law (as asserted), sovereignty not lawfully transferred, U.S. de facto control constitutes prolonged illegal occupation, State of Hawaiʻi is a municipal proxy, and Hawaiʻi is under occupation—not martial law.

It states Verified Hawaiian Subjects qualify automatically as Protected Persons (by law), nationality remains Hawaiian Kingdom nationality, and status exists regardless of occupier acknowledgment.

It summarizes OHS as the highest active authority protecting Hawaiian Subjects, a competent national authority under occupation law, and a government reporting/humanitarian protection agency deriving authority from continuity and international law.

It says COPP documents and gives formal notice of status; rebuts presumed domestic jurisdiction; triggers IHL obligations; puts officials on actual notice; converts detention into an internationally regulated legal matter.

• Immediate separation from general population
• Person no longer treated as inmate/ward (as asserted)
• Continued detention becomes unlawful confinement
• Report to and cooperate with OHS
• Grant OHS access for inspection/health/welfare checks
• Calls/mail become legal matters

It states unlawful confinement is a grave breach; as a continuing offense each day renews liability; mixing with general population constitutes inhuman treatment/coercion and deprivation of protected status; intent not required—knowledge + continuation leads to liability (as stated).

It says OHS may enter facilities, inspect conditions and health, control/monitor communications, demand separation/compliance, retrieve Subjects where no lawful jurisdiction exists, and document violations for accountability.

It says mistreatment/obstruction/retaliation violates occupation law, engages individual criminal responsibility, and extends through chain-of-command via command responsibility, escalating beyond local jurisdiction.

It states grave breaches fall under universal jurisdiction; continued violations may be referred to ICC-OTP; rank/office/following orders do not provide immunity (as presented).

It lists civil remedies including unlawful confinement, civil-rights claims, malicious prosecution, tax/fee recovery, property claims, emotional distress/negligence, declaratory/injunctive relief, accounting/restitution, and class actions—stating each day multiplies exposure.

It concludes that once Protected Person status is documented, the matter is no longer local/discretionary/administrative; it is governed by international law with escalating consequences for non-compliance.

It says the ICC does not “hunt” people in secret or issue political accusations; it exposes potential war criminals through a structured, evidence-driven legal process that creates an international record and, where warranted, prosecutions.

It says exposure begins when credible information reaches the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) via sources such as government/quasi-government submissions, humanitarian agencies, victim communications, judicial records/logs/correspondence, and open-source evidence.

It says OTP assesses jurisdiction, admissibility (gravity/complementarity), and credibility; no one is charged yet, but names/roles/chains of command are mapped and patterns identified, creating reputational and legal exposure.

It says OTP assembles evidence on acts/omissions, knowledge/notice, linkage between decisions and outcomes, and command responsibility; continued conduct after notice increases personal visibility.

It says patterns can demonstrate willfulness, rebut “mistake” defenses, and elevate conduct into prosecutable crimes—describing unlawful confinement as a continuing offense when repeated after notice.

It says if thresholds are met, OTP may seek public arrest warrants or summonses and make public filings detailing alleged crimes and roles—at which point names and roles enter the public domain with real consequences.

It says ICC is a court of last resort; if domestic systems fail to investigate genuinely, shield individuals, or ignore ongoing violations, ICC involvement becomes more likely—inaction after notice increases exposure.

It says exposure extends beyond direct actors to supervisors who knew/should have known and failed to prevent or punish, limiting “plausible deniability.”

• Does not punish institutions—only individuals
• Does not require political recognition to act (as stated)
• Does not rely on rumors or threats
• Does not move without evidentiary thresholds

It says ICC exposure happens by recording conduct into an international legal file, linking actions to individuals, identifying patterns and notice showing willfulness, and publicly naming suspects when thresholds are met—so the law, not politics, speaks.